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Local Government Law
Kenneth M. Murchison*
The 1990-1991 term of the United States Supreme Court was evo-
lutionary rather than revolutionary insofar as local governments were
concerned. Nonetheless, the Court did render several significant decisions.
The Court was generally sensitive to local regulatory powers. It broadly
construed the local immunity from liability under the antitrust laws,'
and it narrowly read the preemption language of the federal pesticide
law.' Clarifying the associational rights of governmental employees, the
Court continued to accept the basic validity of the agency shop in the
public sector; it upheld the power of a union to collect fees from non-
member employees for activities that are germane to collective bargaining
activity.3 In civil rights litigation, the Supreme Court allowed suits for
damages resulting from regulations that violate the dormant Commerce
Copyright 1992, by LOUISIANA LAw REvmw.
J. Denson Smith Professor, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State Uni-
versity. The author expresses his appreciation to his colleague, Tom Galligan, for his
helpful comments on early drafts of portions of this article.
1. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., Ill S. Ct. 1344 (1991)
(no conspiracy exception exists to municipal immunity from antitrust liability); but cf.
Laidlaw Waste Systems, Inc. v. City of Fort Smith, 742 F. Supp. 540 (W.D. Ark. 1990)
(municipality that has opened waste disposal market to competition but has competed
unfairly is not entitled to state action immunity from antitrust laws, even though state
legislature has authorized municipalities to award exclusive franchises to private waste
disposal firms). For a recent Louisiana decision interpreting the state antitrust law, see
Reppond v. City of Denham Springs, 572 So. 2d 224 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990) (state
antitrust law follows federal statute in exempting local displacement of competition only
when local government activities are performed pursuant to a state policy to displace
competition). For a discussion analyzing earlier Supreme Court cases involving the ap-
plicability of federal antitrust laws to local governments, see Murchison, Local Government
Law, Developments in the Law, 1985-1986, 47 La. L. Rev. 305, 312.16 (1986) (hereinafter
cited as Local Government Law, 1985-19861; Murchison, Local Government Law, De-
velopments in the Law, 1984-1985, 46 La. L. Rev. 491, 510 (1985) [hereinafter cited as
Local Government Law, 1984-1985]; Murchison, Local Government Law, Developments
in the Law, 1982-1983, 44 La. L. Rev. 373, 380-84 (1983).
2. Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, Ill S. Ct. 2476 (1991) (Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act does not preempt local regulation of pesticide use).
3. Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, IIl S. Ct. 1950 (1991) (public sector labor union
in agency shop arrangement may, consistently with the first amendment, charge objecting
non-member employees for activities that are germane to collective bargaining activity;
allowance of charges is justified by government's interest in labor peace and avoiding
"free riders" and does not significantly add to the burden on free speech that is inherent
in an agency or union shop).
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Clause,4 but refused to construe statutory authority to award attorney
fees or to authorize an award of fees to expert witnesses.'
Decisions of the federal courts of appeals affecting local government
also merit brief comment. As usual, opinions of the appellate courts
explored a number of details regarding liability under federal civil rights
laws.6 In addition, disputes over the constitutional rights of public em-
ployees produced several noteworthy opinions. The appellate courts ham-
mered out additional details concerning the associational rights of
employees covered by agency shop agreements,7 and they examined other
substantive protections provided by the United States Constitution.,
4. Dennis v. Higgins, Il1 S. Ct. 865 (1991) (suits for damages resulting from state
regulations that violate the dormant Commerce Clause can be brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1982)).
5. West Virginia Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, IIl S. Ct. 1138 (1991).
6. See, e.g., Ansley v. Heinrich, 925 F.2d 1339 (lth Cir. 1991) (jury instructions
in civil rights action should not include reference to issue of public official's entitlement
to qualified immunity because that issue is not one for the jury to consider); Turner v.
Upton County, 915 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 788 (1991) (county
can be held liable under Section 1983 for unconstitutional acts of county sheriff who is
final policymaker in area of law enforcement under state law); Ross v. United States,
910 F.2d 1422 (7th Cir. 1990) (allegation that county's policy of exclusive reliance on
municipal rescue personnel to save drowning victims states a Section 1983 claim for
deprivation of constitutionally protected right to life); Rosenstein v. City of Dallas, 901
F.2d 61 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 153 (1990) (failure to provide probationary
police officer with "name-clearing hearing" after his discharge violated officer's rights
under Section 1983). For recent commentaries on the liability of local governments under
Section 1983. see Blum, Monell, DeShaney, and Zinermon: Official Policy. Affirmative
Duty, Established State Procedure and Local Government Liability Under Section 1983,
24 Creighton L. Rev. I (1990); DeGrazia, New Trends in Municipal Liability: Changing
Patterns in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims, 1989 Det. C.L. Rev. 1415 (1989).
7. See, e.g., Dashiell v. Montgomery County, 925 F.2d 750 (4th Cir. 1991) (union's
allocation of agency shop fees of non-union members need not be certified by an in-
dependent auditor); Grunwald v. San Bernardino City Unified Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 1223
(9th Cir. 1990) (procedure for collecting agency shop fees violated first amendment rights
of non-members).
8. See, e.g., Piesco v. City of New York, 933 F.2d 1149 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 331 (1991) (public employee's interest in testifying truthfully on matters of
public concern when called before a legislative committee must be accorded significant
weight by court when it balances that interest against city's countervailing interest in
promoting efficient performance of services); Upton v. Thompson, 930 F.2d 1209 (7th
Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3481 (U.S. Dec. 23, 1991) (deputy sheriffs
enjoy sufficient autonomy and discretionary authority to allow elected sheriff to consider
party loyalty in hiring decisions); Smith v. Town of Eaton, 910 F.2d 1469 (7th Cir. 1990).
cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 1587 (1991) (failure to suspend or to fire two other officers
against whom complaints had been made was insufficient to establish plaintiff's equal
protection claim); Kinsey v. Salado Indep. Sch. Dist., 916 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1990), reh'g
granted, 925 F.2d 118 (1991), vacated and superseded on reh'g, No. 89-1717 (5th Cir.
Jan. 3, 1992) (1992 WL 744) (superintendent's interest in publicly expressing support for
one faction of school board during election outweighs board's interest in assuring su-
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The Supreme Court has recently agreed to review one potentially
important decision of the Fifth Circuit. Collins v. City of Harker Heights
held that a plaintiff's allegation that the city's inadequate safety training
of sanitation employees reflected a policy of deliberate indifference to-
ward the fourteenth amendment rights of the employees failed to state
a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court of appeals ruled that section
1983 was inapplicable because the allegation involved the defendant in
its capacity as employer rather than as governing body. The ultimate
impact of the decision remains uncertain, however, now that the Supreme
Court has granted certiorari.
In state court litigation, opinions of the Louisiana Supreme Court
addressed a number of issues. The court rendered a trio of decisions
concerning land use controls'0 and a similar number explaining the tort
liability of local governments and public employees." Other decisions
involved the remedies available to an unsuccessful bidder under the
public contract law,' civil service appeals procedures, 3 the constitu-
tionality of the state ethics commission for elected officials,' 4 the evidence
perintendent's loyalty by suppressing superintendent's speech and thus superintendent's
discharge violated first amendment).
9. 916 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, Ill S. Ct. 1579 (1991).
10. Lake Terrace Property Owners Ass'n v. City of New Orleans, 567 So. 2d 69
(La. 1990) (city had legal authority to alienate immovable property subject to building
restrictions requiring property be used as a public walk as long as city determined that
property was no longer needed for public purposes and it remained subject to restrictions);
City of New Orleans v. Elms, 566 So. 2d 626 (La. 1990) (because city police officers
who worked at a party at private residence had a duty to report "seeming" violations
of the zoning ordinance, city had "constructive knowledge" that the property was being
used for commercial purposes so as to begin the two-year prescriptive period for prosecuting
violations); Palermo Land Co. v. Planning Comm'n of Calcasieu Parish, 561 So. 2d 482
(La. 1990) (state law did not preempt entire field of regulation of sanitary landfills, and
the actions of the parish governing body did not estop it from rezoning property). For
an analysis of the Palermo decision, see infra notes 89-111 and accompanying text.
11. Monteville v. Terrebonne Parish Consol. Gov't, 567 So. 2d 1097 (La. 1990)
(recreational use immunity statutes did not apply to state or its political subdivisions);
Moresi v. State, 567 So. 2d 1081 (La. 1990) (game agents were entitled to qualified
immunity from hunters' action that was based on state constitutional provisions prohibiting
unreasonable searches and seizures and invasions of privacy); Brown v. Tesack, 566 So.
2d 955 (La. 1990) (school board breached duty by disposing of flammable substance in
school dumpster that was easily accessible to students). For a detailed analysis of the
Monteville opinion, see infra notes 143-169 and accompanying text.
12. Airline Constr. Co. v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 568 So. 2d 1029 (La. 1990).
For an analysis of the decision, see infra notes 112-142 and accompanying text.
13. Turner v. Department of Health and Hosps., 561 So. 2d 721 (La. 1990) (per
curiam) (dismissal of employee's appeal was improper where notice of appeal was mailed
with insufficient postage during the 30-day appeal period).
14. State Bd. of Ethics for Elected Officials v. Green, 566 So. 2d 623 (La. 1990)
(legislative appointment of members of the Committee on Campaign Finance Disclosure
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necessary to convict an employee of public payroll fraud, 5 and the scope
of the public records law.' 6
The decisions of the state courts of appeal covered an even wider
range of topics. The bulk of the decisions again involved employment
and tort issues, but the opinions also touched on a host of others.
The employment cases involved both statutory and constitutional
issues. The largest group of cases involved statutory issues, specifically,
the substantive'7 and procedural" protections provided to civil service
does not violate the separation of powers doctrine of the state constitution); see Comment,
Usurping the Executive Power: State Board of Ethics for Elected Officials v. Green, 51
La. L. Rev. 911 (1991).
15. State v. Lubrano, 563 So. 2d 847 (La. 1990) (because of unreliability of private
employer's records, evidence was insufficient to convict defendant of public payroll fraud).
16. State v. Nicholls College Found., 564 So. 2d 682 (La. 1990) (public records law
applied to nonprofit corporation that received public funds from another nonprofit cor-
poration with the same purpose); cf. Harrison v. Norris, 569 So. 2d 585 (La. App. 2d
Cir.), writ denied, 571 So. 2d 657 (1990) (action for postconviction relief did not fall
within the criminal litigation exception to public records law).
17. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Department of Property Management, 577 So. 2d 1026
(La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 582 So. 2d 1312 (1991) (employee's absence from his
job for one week sufficiently impaired efficient operation of public service to warrant
dismissal); City of St. Martinville v. Norman, 577 So. 2d 831 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ
denied, 581 So. 2d 692 (1991) (city did not abuse its discretion in terminating officer
who falsified evidence and who could have been criminally charged with crime of theft);
Orleans Levee Dist. v. Glenn, 577 So. 2d 336 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991) (district could
discharge worker who failed to report for work within fifteen days of civil service
commission's reinstatement order); Cha-Jua v. Department of Fire, 577 So. 2d 332 (La.
App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 580 So. 2d 675 (1991) (city could discharge fire fighter for
failure to disclose prior disciplinary action on reemployment application); Hall v. De-
partment of Police, 571 So. 2d 178 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990) (evidence that officer
disobeyed an order of his superior officer and potentially disrupted evidence at the scene
of a crime provided adequate cause for officer's suspension and demotion); Brumfield v.
Department of Fire, 569 So. 2d 75 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990) (civil service commission
abused its discretion in terminating fire fighter rather than allowing him twenty-nine weeks
of statutory sick leave to complete substance abuse treatment program); Laborde v.
Alexandria Mun. Fire & Police Civil Serv. Bd., 566 So. 2d 426 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990),
writ denied, 568 So. 2d 1055 (1991) (officer's membership on DWI task force did not
provide cause for dismissal when officer was arrested on charge of driving while intoxicated
while off duty).
18. Jones v. Department of Pub. Works, 573 So. 2d 567 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ
denied, 577 So. 2d 12 (1991) (appointing authority's failure to call co-worker as witness
did not raise presumption that co-worker's testimony would have been adverse, because
co-worker was equally available as witness to dismissed employee); Prudhomme v. De-
partment of Police, 568 So. 2d 595 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990) (employee had burden of
proving that she was discriminated against on the basis of her gender in connection with
her transfer); Robinson v. City of Baton Rouge, 566 So. 2d 415 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990)
(grievance procedure in contract between city and union was not mandatory, so civil
service board had jurisdiction to consider fire fighter's grievance); cf. Carter v. Department
of Revenue and Taxation, 563 So. 2d 920 (La. App. ist Cir. 1990) (state civil service
commission could not summarily dismiss appeal for failure to allege sufficient facts to
support conclusion of discrimination).
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employees and the tenure rights of teachers and other school employees. 9
Like the federal appellate courts, Louisiana's courts of appeal also
rendered several decisions that involved the substantive constitutional
rights of public employees. 20 In addition, the state courts had to resolve
questions of procedural due process 2' as well as state law issues con-
cerning unionization of employees of local governments."
19. Burns v. Monroe City Sch. Bd., 577 So. 2d 1205 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied,
581 So. 2d 683, 686 (1991) (discharge of plaintiff as contract supervisor was subject to
school board's reduction in force policy, and plaintiff was improperly terminated under
guise of permitting her contract to expire when she had certification but another supervisor
who lacked certification was retained); Morgan v. Livingston Parish Sch. Bd., 577 So.
2d 176 (La. App. ist Cir.), writ denied, 578 So. 2d 933 (1991) (school board had authority
to implement plan for gradually changing to privately owned buses for student trans-
portation notwithstanding tenure rights of drivers); Carpenter v. Catahoula Parish Sch.
Bd., 566 So. 2d 1013 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990) (statutory remedy of back pay and
reinstatement for improper discharge was not an exclusive remedy and general damages
would be appropriate if teacher proved intentional tort by members of the school board);
cf. Perkins v. State Bd. of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 562 So. 2d 930 (La. App.
Ist Cir.), writ denied, 565 So. 2d 448 (1990) (teacher's service as civil servant at state
school when it was under Department of Health and Human Resources control could be
credited toward acquisition of tenure).
20. Normand v. City of Baton Rouge, 572 So. 2d 1123 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990)
(cartoons depicting rats identified as members of the police department engaging in sexual
relations were not entitled to constitutional protection because they pertained to personal
disputes and grievances, not political, social or other concerns of the community); Dix
v. City of Lake Charles, 569 So. 2d 1112 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990), writ denied, 573 So.
2d 1120 (1991) (employer's interest in promoting efficiency of public service outweighed
police officer's free speech interest in making statements questioning the arrest of a city
council member); Finkelstein v. Barthelemy, 565 So. 2d 1098 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990)
(position of city attorney is a policymaking position allowing discharge of attorney for
political reasons).
21. Johnson v. Department of Police, 575 So. 2d 440 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991)
(termination of police officer with permanent status was fundamentally unfair where
appointing authority produced no evidence at hearing to prove factual basis supporting
dismissal); Ayio v. Parish of West Baton Rouge Sch. Bd., 569 So. 2d 234 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1990) (parish deprived school bus driver of due process rights by suspending driver
without a pre-termination hearing, but deprivation did not invalidate subsequent dismissal);
cf. Department of Public Safety and Corrections v. Savoie, 569 So. 2d 139 (La. App.
Ist Cir. 1990) (state's failure to forward employee's responses with recommendation for
discharge did not deprive the employee of due process). For a due process decision of
the Texas Supreme Court, see Davis v. Bexar County Sheriff's Civil Serv. Comm'n, 802
S.W.2d 659 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 57 (1991) (due process does
not require that an employee of county sheriff's office be notified of witnesses against
him prior to pre-termination hearing or post-termination hearing).
22. Louisiana Public Employees Council 17 v. City of Lake Charles, 567 So. 2d
1185 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 572 So. 2d 62 (1990) (municipality's decision to
offset reduction in state supplemental compensation for law enforcement and fire personnel
did not qualify as a "raise" that would obligate the municipality to increase wages paid
to its other employees under a collective bargaining agreement); Davis v. Terrebonne
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
None of the tort decisions involving local governments pro-
duced dramatic change in Louisiana law, but they do address a variety
of subjects. Among the questions which these decisions discuss are the
personal liability of local employees, 3 the identification of the govern-
mental entities responsible for the torts of local employees,4 the standard
of care applicable in negligence2 and strict liability 6 actions, causation
Parish Sch. Bd., 563 So. 2d 1278 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1990) (union did not suffer irreparable
damage or injury by reason of school board's delay in reinstituting payroll deduction
plan for union fees).
23. Oliver v. DeLarge, 563 So. 2d 560 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990) (police officer could
be held personally liable for damages that occurred during his employment when damages
resulted from officer's negligence).
24. Doe v. City of New Orleans, 577 So. 2d 1024 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied,
580 So. 2d 924 (1991) (school board could be held liable for damages suffered by child
who was sexually molested in restroom even though suit was dismissed against teacher
of child); Chance v. State, 567 So. 2d 683 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990) (state was not entitled
to indemnity from sheriff for injuries sustained in "washout" on public highway, because
sheriff did not owe a duty to inform the state of the washout); cf. Cazenave v. Pierce,
568 So. 2d 1360 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990), writ denied, 572 So. 2d 68 (1991) (state was
vicariously liable for intentional tort of dental resident committed within the course and
scope of the resident's employment).
25. Brown v. Tesack, 566 So. 2d 955 (La. 1990) (school board breached duty by
disposing of flammable substance in school dumpster that was easily accessible to students);
Horn v. City of Lafayette, 578 So. 2d 232 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 584 So. 2d
1165, 1167 (1991) (failure of police officer who was proceeding through a red light while
operating his vehicle on an emergency basis to observe motorist was sole cause of accident);
Blanchard v. Republic Ins. Group, 576 So. 2d 1226 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1991) (evidence
supported finding that parish was negligent even though it was not strictly liable for
injury that occurred when plaintiff tripped over water meter lid); Valient Ins. Co. v. City
of Lafayette, 574 So. 2d 505 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991) (city had duty not to reenergize
power line when it knew or should have known that the downed primary line would
cause an immediate danger); LeBlanc v. City of New Orleans, 573 So. 2d 1274 (La. App.
4th Cir.), writ denied, 575 So. 2d 826 (1991) (city had no duty to conduct periodic
inspections to determine whether potholes existed on street in French Quarter); DeGruy
v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 573 So. 2d 1188 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991) (board's procedure
of checking and clearing school hallway after each class period was reasonable under the
circumstances); Coleman v. Rabon, 561 So. 2d 897 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 567
So. 2d 617 (1990) (city was not negligent in failing to post a police officer at intersection
at which the traffic signal was malfunctioning); Burkett v. Honeyman, 561 So. 2d 857
(La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 567 So. 2d 613 (1990) (city was not negligent in failing
to place guard rails in front of bridge girder).
26. Turner v. Pointe Coupee Parish Sch. Bd., 577 So. 2d 755 (La. App. Ist Cir.),
writ denied, 580 So. 2d 673 (1991) (compliance with statute imposing criminal sanctions
for failure to use safety glazing materials in hazardous location did not relieve board
from civil liability for using door in elementary school with glass panels that lacked safety
coating); Watts v. Tangipahoa Parish Council, 576 So. 2d 1063 (La. App. Ist Cir.), writ
denied, 581 So. 2d 690 (1991) (evidence supported trial court's findings that pothole that
caused accident presented an unreasonable risk of injury and that parish had actual or
constructive notice of the existence of the pothole); Fontenot v. Soileau, 567 So. 2d 815
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issues," the duties that local governments owe to members of the public,2"
the scope of statutes conferring immunity on local governments and
their employees,29 and the exemption of deputy sheriffs from the man-
(La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 571 So. 2d 656 (1990) (city was liable for injury caused
by obstruction of traffic sign); Dodson v. Webster Parish Police Jury, 564 So. 2d 760
(La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 567 So. 2d 1127 (1990) (evidence of noncompliance with
road standards did not prove existence of hazardous defect in road that was constructed
before standards were established); Morrow v. Sewerage and Water Bd., 562 So. 2d 1082
(La. App. 4th.Cir. 1990) (city was not liable for injuries from defendant's fall in absence
of evidence that it had actual or constructive notice of sidewalk defect); Clark v. Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co., 562 So. 2d 50 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990) (conclusion of jury and
judge that a crack in municipal sidewalk was not an unreasonably dangerous defect was
not manifestly erroneous); Burkett v. Honeyman, 561 So. 2d 857 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1990)
(city was not liable for damages resulting from collapse of bridge that was in reasonably
safe condition for those exercising ordinary care and prudence).
27. Holt v. Rapides Parish Police Jury, 574 So. 2d 525 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991)
(police jury's failure to trim roadside foliage was not a cause-in-fact of accident); Johnson
v. American S. Ins. Co., 569 So. 2d 1071 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990) (parish could not be
held liable for damages resulting from accident without proof that its lack of maintenance
was a substantial factor in bringing about the accident); Naquin v. St. John the Baptist
Police Jury, 562 So. 2d 934 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 568 So. 2d 1063 (1990)
(evidence established that downed stop sign was not the legal cause of accident); Socorro
v. Orleans Levee Bd., 561 So. 2d 739 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part on other grounds, 579 So. 2d 931 (1991) (in light of primary duty of swimmer to
ascertain whether it is safe to conduct such activities in unknown waters, city's share of
damages from diving accident was limited to 25% of injuries).
28. Claiborne v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 578 So. 2d 153 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1991) (city
had no duty to discover, and to warn plaintiff about, potential hazards associated with
design defect in gas hot water heater); David v. Cajun Contractors, Inc., 572 So. 2d 713
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1990) (police jury had no responsibility for construction of project,
even though as governing authority for parish it had issued construction permit); Coates
v. Nettles, 563 So. 2d 1257 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1990) (park commission had no duty to
construct fence along street that crossed park). For analyses of similar issues in other
states, see Comment, The Scope of the Public Duty/Special Duty Doctrine in Illinois:
Municipal Liability for Failure to Provide Police Protection, 10 N. Ill. U.L. Rev. 269
(1990); Note, Governmental Immunity: A Massachusetts Perspective on the Public Duty
Rule, 24 New Eng. L. Rev. 1333 (1990).
29. Gary v. Meche, 577 So. 2d 833 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 581 So. 2d 692,
695 (1991) (defense of immunity based on policy-making or discretionary acts raised factual
issues that could not be raised on motions for summary judgment or exceptions of no
cause of action); Valet v. City of Hammond, 577 So. 2d 155 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1991)
(discretionary function exception to tort liability did not immunize city from liability for
its failure to maintain road shoulder); Jones v. New Orleans Aviation Bd., 572 So. 2d
1191 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990) (dispute of material fact required remand to determine
whether decisions of aviation board involved the type of policy judgment for which state
law immunizes local governments from liability); Tenhaaf v. Quenqui, 571 So. 2d 898
(La. App. 5th Cir. 1990) (statute immunizing public entities and their officers and employees
for performance of or failure to perform discretionary acts does not eliminate liability
for negligence in carrying out fire inspections).
1992]
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datory coverage of the worker's compensation law."
The remaining opinions of the courts of appeal spanned a diverse
group of issues. Several of the questions raised in these cases involved
intergovernmental relations including the relationship between the state
and local governments 3" and preemption.'2 Other decisions addressed
election qualifications, 3' the police powers of parishes,34 zoning and land
use," expropriation authority,' 6 tax assessments, 7 public contracts,'38 the
30. Gegenheimer v. Lee, 578 So. 2d 264 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1991) (remand was
required for determination of whether technician was a deputy sheriff who was not entitled
to worker's compensation coverage); McKenzie v. Marino, 575 So. 2d 506 (La. App. 5th
Cir. 1991) (deputy sheriff is not entitled to worker's compensation benefits unless local
governmental subdivision voluntarily chooses to provide coverage).31. Twenty-First Judicial Dist. Court v. State, 563 So. 2d 1185 (La. App. Ist Cir.),
writ denied, 568 So. 2d 1082, 1088 (1990) (statutes requiring local governments to fund
part of district court's operating expenses did not unconstitutionally delegate legislative
authority or violate equal protection clause of state constitution).
32. Desormeaux Enters., Inc. v. Village of Mermantau, 568 So. 2d 213 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1990); Restivo v. City of Shreveport, 566 So. 2d 669 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1990);
see infra notes 41-88 and accompanying text.
33. Ozen v. Abraham, 566 So. 2d 1048 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990) (candidate was disqualified
when he failed to establish that he had actually been domiciled in the district from which
he sought election for one year preceding qualification); Villane v. Azar, 566 So. 2d 645
(La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 567 So. 2d 1108 (1990) (judicial candidate failed to establish
that he had moved his domicile from Orleans to Jefferson Parish).
34. West Baton Rouge Parish Police Jury v. Westside Aero, Ltd., 572 So. 2d 1127 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1990), wit denied, 575 So. 2d 394 (1991) (even though police jury was the
governing authority of airport district, it was not entitled to an injunction against operation
of private airport where it had never promulgated regulations governing approval of airport
operations).
35. Congregation of St. Patrick Roman Catholic Church v. City of New Orleans,
575 So. 2d 415 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991) (municipal ordinance prohibiting issuance of
alcoholic beverage permits to establishments located within 300 feet of church contained
an implicit exception for bona fide restaurants); Wilkinson v. LaFranz, 574 So. 2d 403
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1991) (mandamus was not an appropriate remedy to force public
officers to enforce zoning ordinances); Hero Lands Co. v. City of New Orleans, 566 So.
2d 149 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 571 So. 2d 647 (1990) (city council had authority
to approve ordinance even though recommendation of approval had not been made to
city by majority of planning commission as specified in home rule charter).
36. Hobgood v. Parish of East Baton Rouge, 563 So. 2d 413 (La. App. Ist Cir.),
writ denied, 567 So. 2d 105 (1990) (where act creating airport district specifically authorized
it to acquire aviation servitude by expropriation, district could expropriate servitudes even
though airport was allegedly owned by parish rather than by district). For a recent student
commentary on Louisiana expropriation law, see Comment, Compensating an Owner to
the Full Extent of His Loss: A Reevaluation of Compensable Damages in Louisiana
Expropriation Cases, 51 La. L. Rev. 821 (1991).
37. Park Esplanade Ltd. Partnership v. Williams, 577 So. 2d 1028 (La. App' 4th
Cir. 1991) (alleged unlerassessment of property did not constitute an "erroneous assess-
ment" subject to correction).
38. Terral Barge Line, Inc. v. Madison Parish Port Comm'n, 577 So. 2d 787 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1991) (commission had discretion to accept next highest bid or to reject all bids once
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Public Records Law,3 9 and municipal utility servicesA°
The discussion that follows focuses on state law issues. It begins
with an analysis of three cases that discuss when state law preempts
local regulatory authority. The remainder of the article focuses on three
other problems raised in specific decisions of the Louisiana Supreme
Court: the authority of local governments to rezone property, the rem-
edies available to unsuccessful bidders on public contracts, and the
nonapplicability of the recreational use immunity statute to governmental
bodies.
STATE PREEMPTION
The Louisiana Constitution forbids parishes and municipalities from
exercising any power or function denied by general law." Some evidence
suggests that the constitutional convention intended for this language to
require an express denial from the legislature,42 but the state's judiciary
has never adopted so doctrinaire a position. In several cases arising
since the adoption of the 1974 Constitution, the Louisiana Supreme
Court has affirmed that, even without an express preemption provision,
it had determined that highest bid was not in substantial compliance with public bid law);
Gibson Roofers, Inc. v. Terrebonne Parish Consol. Gov't, 577 So. 2d 362 (La. App. 1st
Cir.), writ denied, 580 So. 2d 672 (1991) (bid bond on parish public works project had to
be written by surety on the United States Department of the Treasury Financial Management
Service list of approved bonding companies); F.H. Myers Constr. Corp. v. City of New
Orleans, 570 So. 2d 84 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990) (city could permit lowest bidder to provide
reinsurance of bid bond in order to comply with bid requirements); Drachenberg v. Parish
of Jefferson, 563 So. 2d 523 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1990) (actions of member of parish council
could not bind the entire council to contract); Professional Constr. Servs., Inc. v. Parish of
Jefferson, 562 So. 2d 1184 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1990) (amendment to attorney fee provision
of Public Works Act was a substantive provision that did not apply retroactively).
39. Hatfield v. Bush, 572 So. 2d 588 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990), writ denied, 576 So.
2d 49 (1991) (requests for leave submitted by employees were records covered by public
disclosure law and their release did not violate privacy interests of employees); Marine Shale
Processors, Inc. v. State. 572 So. 2d 280 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990) (Department of Health
and Hospitals study to determine whether connection existed between environmental conditions
in parish and incidence of rare cancer fell within public health disease investigation exemption
to the Public Records Act); State v. Campbell, 566 So. 2d 1038 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990)
(defendant in cocaine prosecution was entitled to copy of initial offense report when report
would not reveal the identity of any confidential informant or undercover police officer or
any information about ongoing undercover criminal activity).
40. Southwest La. Elec. Membership Corp. v. City of Opelousas, 573 So. 2d 1319
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1991) (when city voters approved two proposals to operate city's electric
system, city could contract with either company submitting a proposal).
41. La. Const. art. VI, §§ 4, 5, 7; see generally Murchison, Local Government Law,
Developments in the Law, 1979-1980, 41 La. L. Rev. 483, 485-86 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as Local Government Law, 1979-1980]; Murchison, Local Government Law, The Work
of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1977-1978 Term, 39 La. L. Rev. 843, 851-53
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Local Government Law, 1977-1978].
42. See Murchison, Local Government Law, 1977-1978, supra note 41, at 858-59.
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a local government can be denied a power by general law when a fair
construction of the relevant state statutes would forbid local regulation.4'3
A 1989 decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court offered a useful
summary of preemption principles." Drawing on decisions discussing
federal preemption of state law,45 the court emphasized that state pre-
emption issues are resolved "by similar analyses." In the absence of an
express statutory provision, a state statute preempts local regulations
only when the legislative purpose is "clear and manifest" or "the exercise
of dual authority is repugnant to the [state legislative) objective."4 To
determine whether preemption exists, the court focuses on three factors:
the pervasiveness of the state regulatory scheme, the need for statewide
uniformity to achieve the purposes of the state statute, and the danger
of conflicts in the enforcement of the state statute and local ordinance. 47
Louisiana's appellate courts decided three preemption cases in 1990-
1991. The supreme court upheld a local zoning ordinance that precluded
expansion of a sanitary landfill,48 while the third circuit ruled that state
laws governing underground injection wells preempted a local ordinance
forbidding such facilities. 49 Finally, the second circuit held that state
licensing of journeymen plumbers did not preclude a municipality from
requiring that journeymen work under the supervision of a master plumber
when they install piping. 0
In Palermo Land Co. v. Planning Commission,' the Louisiana
Supreme Court emphatically rejected the argument that the state's en-
vironmental laws prohibited local zoning ordinances that controlled the
siting of landfills. Justice Cole's opinion in Palermo began its analysis
of the preemption issue by emphasizing that no "express constitutional,
codal, or statutory provision grant[s the state the sole power to 'regulate'
the siting of sanitary landfills." 2 The opinion then went on to offer
43. See, e.g., Rollins Envtl. Servs. of La., Inc. v. Iberville Parish Police Jury, 371
So. 2d 1127 (La. 1979); City of Shreveport v. Curry, 357 So. 2d 1078 (La. 1978).
44. Hildebrand v. City of New Orleans, 549 So. 2d 1218, 1227-28 (La. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1476 (1990) (holding that state had not preempted the field of "death
taxation").
45. Id. at 1227, citing New York State Dept. of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S.
405, 93 S. Ct. 940 (1973); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 76 S. Ct. 477 (1956);
Poche v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 339 So. 2d 1212 (La. 1976).
46. 549 So. 2d at 1227.
47. Id. at 1227-28.
48. Palermo Land Co. v. Planning Comm'n, 561 So. 2d 482. 497-98 (La. 1990).
49. Desormeaux Enters., Inc. v. Village of Mermentau, 568 So. 2d 213 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1990).
50. Restivo v. City of Shreveport, 566 So. 2d 669 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1990).
51. 561 So. 2d 482 (La. 1990).
52. Id. at 497.
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two reasons why no preemptive intent should be inferred from state
environmental statutes.
First, the opinion called attention to the administrative construction
of state law by the agency responsible for enforcing environmental
statutes. Not only did the administrative environment merely involve the
absence of regulations "purporting to displace local authority over land
use planning to control the citing of sanitary landfills," but the De-
partment of Environmental Quality (DEQ) had affirmatively endorsed
compliance with local zoning ordinances: DEQ's ,regulations mandated
"compliance with local zoning ordinances [as] a pre-requisite to obtaining
a solid waste disposal permit."' 3
Second, the Palermo opinion analyzed the general purposes of the
state environmental legislation and discerned no conflict between those
objectives and "the existence of local authority to control land use for
solid waste disposal sites through zoning." The state laws focused on
"eradication or minimization of pollution." To achieve that goal for
solid waste disposal, the state "regulate[s] 'solid waste disposal prac-"
tices.' ' 4 Nothing in "local land use planning through zoning" interferes
with the state's primary concern, which is "the control or regulation
of the process of disposing of solid waste from an engineering or
geophysical viewpoint." 55 Implicitly recognizing that state regulations
were designed to strike a balance between environmental protection and
the state's need to dispose of solid wastes, Palermo declared that local
governments "cannot set geological or engineering standards stricter than
those established by the [DEQ] for the issuance of its permits." However,
"factors other than geological ones, such as those involving aesthetics,
population density, and accessibility govern the selection of the landfill
site, and these factors are the appropriate subject of local land use
planning."5 6
The supreme court's resolution of the preemption issue was a Sound
one. The aim of the 1974 Constitution was to expand the authority of
local governments without compromising the state's police power. 7 The
court's opinion in Palermo astutely reconciled those two goals. The
continued use of precatory language that requires a "clear" expression
53. Id. at 498.
54. Id., citing La. R.S. 30:2152.
55. Id., citing City of Baton Rouge v. Hebert, 378 So. 2d 144, 146 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1979), writ denied, 380 So. 2d 1210 (1980), a decision that refused to find that
regulations governing oil production and storage preempted a local zoning ordinance
excluding petroleum storage tanks.
56. 561 So. 2d at 498.
57. La. Const. art. VI, §§ 4, 5, 6, 7, 9; see generally Murchison, Local Government
Law, 1979-1980, supra note 41, at 485-86; Murchison, Local Government Law 1977-1978,
supra note 41, at 851-52.
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of legislative intent or a "repugnancy" between state and local objectives
creates a mild, but rebuttable, presumption against implied preemption.
This approach enhances local authority without impairing the state's
ability to have the final word on what regulations are appropriate.
Likewise, the emphasis on the objectives of state legislation rather than
the number of statutory provisions preserves state control, but only when
additional local regulation would directly impede important state goals.
The court also reached the proper result in Palermo. The absence
of preemptive language in a statute that details many of the state's
responsibilities cautions against broadly proscribing local zoning powers
that are authorized by the Louisiana Constitution"' and the Louisiana
Revised Statutes,"9 especially when the agency that has been entrusted
with responsibility for enforcing the statutes perceives no need for pre-
emption. Deference to administrative interpretation by such an agency
is a well-established principle of statutory construction,6 and the re-
gulations of the DEQ expressly defer to local zoning regulations. Finally,
the court correctly identified the thrust or focus of the state's environ-
mental laws relating to sanitary landfills. These laws were primarily
designed to upgrade waste disposal practices, and they include no mech-
anism for the type of comprehensive area planning that should lead to
sound zoning decisions.
Several months after the supreme court decision in Palermo, the
third circuit in Desormeaux Enterprises, Inc. v. Village of Mermentau l
reached a contrary conclusion regarding a municipality's ordinance for-
bidding the location of underground disposal wells within its borders.
The appellate court embraced the Palermo principles, but found sufficient
evidence of a preemptive intent to distinguish the supreme court opinion.
The case involved a company which desired to convert an oil and
gas well in the village of Mermentau into a disposal well for salt water
wastes generated at other production wells. After the company published
58. La. Const. art. VI, § 17.
59. The zoning enabling act applies only to municipalities and certain specified par-
ishes. See La. R.S. 33:4721-32 (1988), but several other provisions refer to zoning by
parish governing authorities, see, e.g. La. R.S. 33:1236(36), (38), 4877, 4877.1, 4877.2
(1988); see generally, Murchison, Recent Environmental Developments Affecting Louisiana
Petroleum Operations, 26 Inst. on Min. L. 54, 82 n.142 (1980); Murchison, Local Gov-
ernment Law, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1978-79 Term, 40
La. L. Rev. 681, 706 n.116 (1980). and an uncodified local law grants zoning authority
to the Calcasieu Parish Police Jury. 1960 La. Acts No. 196.
60. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 2781-82 (1984); Washington v. St. Charles Parish Sch.
Bd., 288 So. 2d 321 (La. 1974); State v. Standard Oil Co. of La., 190 La. 338, 182 So.
531 (1938).
61. 568 So. 2d 213 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990).
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a notice of its intent to apply for a state permit to operate the disposal
well, the village adopted an ordinance that would have had the effect
of forbidding operation of the disposal well. The new ordinance pro-
hibited importation "on any land within the Village" of any waste
material and specifically included "any foreign material which is con-
sidered waste and must be disposed of, as salt-water for injection into
sub-surface well" within its scope. 62
After quoting Palermo's summary of preemption principles, the third
circuit enumerated the factors that led it to reach a different conclusion
with respect to disposal wells. The court offered two textual arguments
to support its analysis: the use of the mandatory verb "shall" in de-
scribing the Department of Conservation's jurisdiction over disposal
wells, 63 and the requirement that the Commissioner of Conservation
specify criteria for the "location" of disposal wells as well as their
"design and operation." In addition, the court emphasized the pervasive
nature of state regulations affecting disposal wells by quoting from a
supreme court decision that described the statewide order governing
disposal wells as "a comprehensive set of regulations establishing the
criteria to be met in order to obtain a disposal well permit."4 Finally,
the court noted that the local government retained the right to oppose
the issuance of the disposal well permit before the Commissioner. 6
None of the court's grounds for distinguishing Palermo are per-
suasive. The words of the statute establishing the Department of Con-
servation are virtually identical to those of the Environmental Affairs
Act. The environmental law also uses "shall" to describe the Depart-
ment's jurisdiction over the "regulation of solid waste,"" and it au-
thorizes regulations that govern "disposal site location." 67 As the supreme
court correctly noted in Palermo, this language contains nothing to
manifest a finding that the legislature intended the state to exercise
"sole" regulatory power." Nor is the regulation more pervasive in the
context of disposal wells. Indeed, the solid waste disposal statute ex-
pressly declares that "the safety and welfare of the people of Louisiana
require efficient and reasonable regulation of solid waste disposal prac-
62. Id. at 214 (quoting Mermentau, La., Ordinance 225 (1984)).
63. Id. at 215 (citing La. R.S. 30:4(I)(7)).
64. Id. (quoting Rollins Envtl. Servs. of La., Inc. v. lberville Parish Police Jury,
371 So. 2d 1127, 1133 (La. 1979)). For a criticism of the Rollins decision, see Murchison,
Local Covernment Law, 1979-1980, supra note 41, at 486-90.
65. 568 So. 2d at 215 n.2.
66. La. R.S. 30:2011(a)(1) (1989).
67. La. R.S. 30:2154(B)(1) (1989).
68. Palermo Land Co. v. Planning Comm'n, 561 So. 2d 482, 497 (La. 1990).
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tices. ''69 Furthermore, environmental regulations also provide a procedure
for local governments to oppose issuance of state permits. 0
The third circuit's decision also goes farther than prior judicial
decisions that define the powers of the Department of Conservation. In
Palermo, the supreme court itself cited with approval a first circuit
decision that more narrowly defined the preemptive effect of state laws
regulating oil and gas operations. According to the first circuit, the
preemptive effect of state law did not extend to "abridging a munici-
pality's control over land use within its corporate boundar[ies].' ' 7
Unfortunately, the third circuit's decision produces an anomalous
partial preemption of local control over the siting of waste disposal
facilities. When disposal practices are regulated by the DEQ, the state's
environmental trustee, 2 local governments retain their powers to regulate
the siting decision. The legislature has expressly reserved the authority
of local governments to control the location of hazardous waste disposal
facilities," and Palermo infers a similar reservation for nonhazardous
waste. By contrast, the third circuit decision displaces local power when
control of disposal practices is vested in the agency charged with man-
aging the development of mineral production within the state.
The village ordinance before the third circuit does differ from the
Palermo ordinance in one crucial respect, and that difference is sufficient
to justify the result reached by the court of appeal. The village's or-
dinance was a prohibitory reaction to a specific proposal that was not
part of any general land use regulation. Thus, the court was not un-
reasonable in invalidating the ordinance; its error was in using overly
broad preemption language. The error made by the third circuit was
not merely academic. The Louisiana Attorney General has recently em-
braced this error in a context that produced precisely the indefensible
result outlined in the preceding paragraph.74
Louisiana law has long afforded special status to local regulations
of land use. Not only is local power to adopt land use regulations
constitutionally conferred," but both the legislature 76 and the courts"
have shown particular deference to its exercise. Moreover, that deference
69. La. R.S. 30:2152 (1989).
70. See La. Admin. Code 33:VII.lI05(E) (1988) (authorization for public hearing).
71. City of Baton Rouge v. Hebert, 378 So. 2d 144, 146 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1979),
writ denied, 380 So. 2d 1210 (1980).
72. La. Const. art. IX, § 1; see Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana Envtl. Control
Comm'n, 452 So. 2d 1152, 1157 (La. 1984).
73. La. R.S. 30:2180(C) (1989), La. R.S. 33:1236(31) (1988).
74. 90 Op. La. Att'y Gen. 262 (1990); see also 88 Op. La. Att'y Gen. 647 (1989).
75. La. Const. art. VI, § 17.
76. La. R.S. 30:2180(C) (1989), La. R.S. 33:1236(31) (1988).
77. City of Baton Rouge v. Hebert, 378 So. 2d 144, 146 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979),
writ denied, 380 So. 2d 1210 (1980).
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is justified. Land use planning concerns itself with aspects of the social
environment that are not addressed in most state programs of environ-
mental regulations.7s Furthermore, the requirements that land use plan-
ning proceed in accordance with a comprehensive plan and that particular
land use decisions bear a reasonable relationship to valid governmental
objectives provide standards for meaningful, if deferential, review by
the courts.
The third preemption case came from the second circuit and involved
regulation of plumbers rather than controls on waste disposal.7 9 A state
statute recognized two levels of plumbing expertise. The statute defined
a master plumber as a natural person with the "necessary qualifications
and knowledge to plan, lay out and supervise the installation, alteration,
and/or repair of plumbing systems," but provided no method of pro-
cedure for establishing that an individual meets the statutory criteria. 0
By contrast, the definition of a journeyman plumber had two elements.
To qualify as a journeyman, a natural person must possess the "necessary
qualifications to install, alter, and/or repair plumbing systems" and
must be licensed by a state board of examiners."'
Like other municipalities in the state,2 the city of Shreveport also
regulated plumbers, and its ordinance contained provisions not found
in state law. The Shreveport ordinance adopted the state definition of
a master plumber but added an additional requirement that the master
plumber be licensed by the city. It also adopted the state definition of
a journeyman plumber (including the requirement for a state license)
and mandated that the journeyman be "registered" with the city. In
addition, the ordinance recognized a third category of plumber not
mentioned in the state law. A cottage master plumber was defined as
a natural person with "the necessary qualifications and knowledge to
plan, lay out and supervise the installation, alteration and/or repair of
plumbing systems for one-, two- or three-family residences and one-
story commercial buildings, with 5,000 square feet or less of total
building space;" like a master plumber, a cottage master plumber had
to be licensed by the city. Finally, the municipal plumbing code required
any person who installs, alters, or repairs plumbing to work under the
supervision of a master plumber, except that an unsupervised journeyman
plumber could make certain minor repairs not involving any changes in
piping.8
78. See Palermo Land Co. v. Planning Comm'n, 561 So. 2d 482, 498 (La. 1990).
79. Restivo v. City of Shreveport, 566 So. 2d 699 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1990).
80. La. R.S. 37:1377 (1988).
81. Id. A 1990 amendment provides for state licensing of master plumbers, who are
responsible for supervising journeymen. See 1990 La. Acts, No. 752, § I (now codified
in La. R.S. 37:1377 (1988 and Supp. 1991)).
82. 566 So. 2d at 670, 672.
83. Id. at 670 (quoting Shreveport Plumbing Code).
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A journeyman plumber licensed by the state challenged the restric-
tions of the city ordinance. Because the plaintiff had not passed the
city's master plumber exam, the city would not allow him to perform
unsupervised work within its boundaries. The plaintiff argued that state
law preempted the ordinance's requirement that a journeyman plumber
work under the supervision of a master plumber because the ordinance
conflicted with the state law that contained no such requirement.
The second circuit quickly sustained the city's power to license master
plumbers. To uphold local licensing, the court of appeal relied on an
earlier supreme court decision" that had invalidated an earlier Shreveport
ordinance regulating plumbers. Local licensing, the court ruled, was
permissible because state law provided no mechanism "for testing the
qualifications of those persons desiring to progress to the status of a
master plumber." Without a testing mechanism for master plumbers,
the state had "not preempted the area of regulation," and no conflict
existed between state law and the city ordinance."'
Quoting extensively from the opinion of the trial judge, the court
of appeal also upheld the local requirement that a journeyman plumber
must normally work under the supervision of a master plumber. Ac-
cording to the trial court, "the state test for journeyman plumbers is
primarily a test of basic knowledge of plumbing," including "a 'hands
on' exam of how to do basic plumbing." 86 Thus, the state test dem-
onstrates that a journeyman plumber is an individual who has the
necessary skills for "the practical installation of plumbing." By contrast,
the master plumber must understand "the reasons why good plumbing
is done the way it is done" and must know "the rules and regulation
set out by the state and the city ... [and) the dangers associated with
the contamination of the public water system in a large city." Because
nothing in the record suggested that a licensed journeyman plumber had
the knowledge required of a master plumber, state law did not preclude
the city from "exercis[ing] its police power to require the journeyman's
work to be supervised within the city limits." 87
The second circuit appropriately limited the preemptive effect of the
state's provisions regulating plumbers. The state regulations were not so
pervasive as to preclude all local regulations of plumbers. Indeed, to
be effective, the state regulations required supplementation at the local
level. State law recognized that master plumbers possess qualifications
not required of journeyman plumbers, but provided no method for
84. City of Shreveport v. Restivo, 491 So. 2d 377 (La. 1986).
85. Id. at 379-80 (quoted in Restivo v. City of Shreveport, 566 So. 2d 669, 671 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1990)).
86. 566 So. 2d at 672.
87. Id.
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testing those qualifications. Without local regulations that test and license
master plumbers, no mechanism existed for identifying individuals ca-
pable of "plan[ning], lay[ing] out and supervis[ing] the installation,
alteration, and repair of plumbing systems." Moreover, the limits that
Shreveport placed on journeyman plumbers did not conflict with the
requirements of state law. State law defined master plumbers as those
capable of supervising work on plumbing systems; the Shreveport or-
dinance merely provided a method for requiring such supervision when
plumbing involves a change to the piping system.
As these three cases illustrate, preemption doctrine is simple to
articulate but often difficult to apply. The difficulty arises because
implied preemption cases usually require the courts to ascribe a legislative
purpose with respect to an issue that the legislature never directly con-
sidered. In light of the 1974 Constitution's general expansion of local
legislative power, 8 Louisiana's appellate courts should continue to follow
the approach of Palermo. They should refuse to imply a legislative ban
on local regulation without a clear expression of legislative intent or a
significant conflict between state and local enforcement.
REzoNrNo POWER OF LocAL GOVERNMENTS
As the available capacity of a privately owned landfill in Calcasieu
Parish diminished, its owners began to negotiate for the purchase of
adjacent land. Other landowners in the area opposed expansion of the
landfill. Eventually, the opponents persuaded the parish police jury to
rezone the adjacent property to a classification that did not permit
landfills. Broadly defining the power of local governments to change
zoning classifications, Palermo upheld the validity of the police jury's
zoning decision.
The facts surrounding the decision of the Calcasieu Parish Police
Jury were complicated, 9 but a simplified summary is sufficient to un-
derstand the supreme court's decision. Only a portion of the land
adjacent to the landfill was originally zoned 1-2, the classification that
allowed landfills. In separate actions in 1981 and 1985, the police jury
rezoned the remainder of the adjacent land to 1-2. After the second
rezoning, the owners of the landfill signed a conditional purchase agree-
ment with one of the adjacent landowners and spent nearly $600,000
preparing the studies necessary to seek a state permit for landfill ex-
pansion. While the state application was pending, the parish planning
commission prepared a rezoning study. Once the study was completed,
88. See supra note 41.
89. For a more complete summary, see Palermo Land Co. v. Planning Comm'n,
561 So. 2d 482, 484-86 (La. 1990).
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the commission voted to recommend rezoning, and the police jury re-
zoned the property I-1, a classification that did not permit landfills.
In Palermo, the supreme court first rejected the argument that the
police jury should be estopped from rezoning the property. The court
offered two justifications to support its refusal to accept the estoppel
argument. The opponents of the rezoning ordinance failed to prove facts
sufficient to sustain the estoppel claim, and estoppel was an inappropriate
basis for decision because express statutoiy language addressed the issue.
The rationale for rejecting the estoppel claim of the adjacent land-
owners was straightforward. Both landowners "had seen their property
rezoned" previously. Nothing that transpired gave them any "reason to
believe that the property would not ... be rezoned again, or that the
... concerns of other members of the community would be ignored in
rezoning decisions." '9 Nor did the landowners prove facts sufficient to
"support a claim of detrimental reliance." They had not shown that
they had "expended funds in preparation for the landfill" or that either
of them "could have sold his property to another buyer, at the time,
for an equal or greater price." 9'
The landfill owners had expended a considerable sum of money in
seeking to expand the landfill. Nonetheless, the court concluded that
they had not proved facts that would establish an estoppel claim. The
supreme court premised its rejection of the claim of the landfill owners
on a narrow definition of the rights of a property owner under a zoning
ordinance. The court declined to embrace the suggestion "that property
owners have vested property rights in existing zoning classifications."
Describing that "implication" as "completely misleading," the court
declared that "vested rights are properly an issue" in zoning cases only
when "the opponent of the ordinance has obtained a building permit,
has begun construction, and has become liable for work and materials." 92
Judged by this narrow view of property rights in an existing zoning
classification, the estoppel claim of the landfill owners failed because
none of the actions of the police jury, its members, or its employees
could reasonably have led the landfill owners to conclude that the
adjacent land was not subject to rezoning. 91
The principal contention of the opponents of the rezoning was that
the police jury had failed to prove the need for the change to the prior
zoning ordinance. Relying on a 1967 decision of the fourth circuit, 9'
the opponents to the rezoning urged that a special burden of proof be
90. Id. at 486.
91. Id. at 488; see also id. at 487 n.4.
92. Id. at 487 n.4.
93. Id. at 486-88.
94. Dufau v. Parish of Jefferson, 200 So. 2d 335 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
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placed on the police jury in rezoning cases. Before a local government
could change an existing zoning classification, they argued, it had to
show "some mistake in the original zoning" or a significant change in
the "character of the neighborhood.""
The supreme court rejected the claim because it refused to accept
the "change or mistake rule" on which it was based. Noting that the
change or mistake rule had "been rejected in the vast majority of
jurisdictions that have considered the question," the supreme court
dismissed as "an anomaly"96 the one Louisiana decision embracing the
rule. In Louisiana, the court emphasized, the local government respon-
sible for the zoning never has the burden of proving the need for its
decision. A "presumption of validity attaches to all zoning decisions,
and the burden rests on the challenger to overcome this presumption. '"91
To overcome the presumption of validity, the opponent of a zoning
decision must prove that "the result of the [zoning ordinance] is arbitrary
and capricious, and therefore a taking of property without due process
of law." 98 That burden is imposing. The "differing needs" of various
localities "will naturally result in different planning and zoning regu-
lations in each [locality]." The same "need for change" also requires
"rezoning or reclassification." Because those rezoning decisions are based
on the same localized factors, they are properly entrusted to local
officials, with judicial review serving only as a check against "abuse of
the power.""
The supreme court began its analysis of the particular ordinance
before it in Palermo by emphasizing that a zoning decision will be
upheld whenever it is "debatable." The court discounted the testimony
of the opponent's expert because it was largely premised on the position
that the change or mistake rule was an "essential element in justifying
rezoning." The action was not tainted because the police jury was merely
reacting to public opposition to the landfill. The burden imposed on
the opponents was to prove "that the Police Jury did not establish a
connection between the public welfare and the rezoning;" the role that
public opposition played in motivating the rezoning was held to be
"irrelevant." Finally, the court discussed the evidence before the trial
court and concluded that the state of the record was such that "rea-
sonable minds could differ on the question of whether the down-zoning
95. Palermo Land Co. v. Planning Comm'n, 561 So. 2d 482, 489 (La. 1990) (quoting
Dufau v. Parish of Jefferson, 200 So. 2d 335, 338 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967)).
96. 561 So. 2d at 489.
97. Id. at 490. The supreme court did acknowledge that it frequently gave heightened
scrutiny to "piecemeal" or "spot" zoning, although it insisted that this heightened scrutiny
did not involve a shift in the burden of proof.
98. Id. at 492.
99. Id.
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was proper and prudent." That evidence was sufficient, the court ruled,
to satisfy the "debatable" standard and to validate the ordinance.'0
The opponents also offered three procedural objections that the
supreme court quickly rejected. First, the court refused to overturn the
rezoning because the planning commission failed to provide three official
notices of an early meeting in which the commission directed its staff
to conduct the reclassification study. According to the supreme court,
the statute imposing the notice requirement on certain meetings of the
planning commission did not apply to that meeting.' 0' Second, the court
held that publication notice was adequate to discharge the duty to notify
a property owner whose property would be affected by a proposed
rezoning. 0 Third, the court liberally construed the requirement that
zoning ordinances be consistent with a comprehensive plan. 03 Amend-
ments to a zoning ordinance still complied with the statute, the court
declared, "so long as [the] amendments ... are enacted as the need
for specified public accommodation arises." Expert testimony that the
ordinance at issue in Palermo constituted "good land use planning"
was sufficient to satisfy that standard."'
The result and most of the supreme court's opinion in Palermo
deserve praise. Although the court was probably unwise to suggest that
estoppel was never appropriate in zoning matters, the convoluted facts
in the case before the court provided little justification for applying
estoppel principles. As the court itself noted, the adjacent landowners
presented the least appealing estoppel claim. They had themselves sought
zoning changes for the property in the past, and had neither invested
any money nor foregone any profits in reliance on the police jury's
actions. In contrast, the landfill owner had expended a substantial sum
preparing the necessary studies for a landfill expansion, but using es-
toppel theory to protect that investment was still inappropriate. The
owner did not satisfy the traditional rule that only expenditures made
in reliance on a previously issued permit will protect a landowner from
zoning changes.'10 To allow the actions of individual police jurors or
100. Id. at 494-95.
101. Id. at 496, citing 1960 La. Acts, No. 196, § 6; but cf. 561 So. 2d at 496 n.14,
suggesting that the correct statutory reference is La. R.S. 33:4726. The cited amendment
required three notices for any zoning commission meeting held to make "any recom-
mendation to the Police Jury." The purpose of the meeting for which notices were not
provided was to direct the commission staff to prepare the reclassification study. At a
later meeting, the commission did make a recommendation to the police jury, and the
commission complied with the statutory notice requirements for that meeting.
102. 561 So. 2d at 496, construing La. R.S. 33:4877.1.
103. See La. R.S. 33:106 (1988).
104. Palermo Land Co. v. Planning Comm'n, 561 So. 2d 482, 497 (La. 1990).
105. See, e.g., Dunn v. Parish of Jefferson, 256 So. 2d 664 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ
denied, 260 La. 1137, 258 So. 2d 382 (1972).
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even the police jury as a body to preclude future zoning changes would
essentially grant the landowner immunity from the police powers of the
local governing body. Furthermore, the actions of the landfill owner
belied the claim that it was relying on the immutability of existing zoning
ordinances. Its purchase contract with at least one of the landowners
was expressly conditioned on obtaining the necessary licenses and permits
to operate a landfill on the property.106 '
The court was equally wise to reject the argument that the zoning
authority should have to show a mistake in the original zoning or a
change in the neighborhood to support a change in the zoning classi-
fication of a parcel. No sound reason exists for assuming that political
influence is less significant in a prior zoning action than in the rezoning.
Thus, no reason exists for giving special legal protection to the prior
rather than to the subsequent political victor.107 In either case, the legal
standard should be the same: the legislative action of the zoning authority
should stand so long as it is reasonably consistent with good zoning
practices.
Of course, the possibility remains that a legislative body will abuse
its power by singling out a particular parcel for favorable or unfavorable
treatment. The enhanced scrutiny given to spot or piecemeal zoning, 08
however, provides a more straightforward solution for those problems
than does a shifting of the burden of proof. In any event, the Palermo
zoning hardly constituted spot zoning in view of the size of the parcels
and the consistency of the rezoning with the classification of other
property in the area.
The supreme court was also wise to avoid making zoning decisions
turn on legislative motivation. Those attacking the rezoning in Palermo
were undoubtedly correct when they asserted that public opposition to
.landfill expansion influenced the police jury in its deliberations. Zoning
and rezoning decisions are, however, legislative functions,' °9 and a leg-
islative body may appropriately respond to public opinion. Only if the
legislature arbitrarily disregards good land use planning practices or acts
in a manner inconsistent with the comprehensive plan is a zoning clas-
sification decision invalid, and such an arbitrary decision is invalid
regardless of the motive of the body that made the decision.
106. 561 So. 2d at 485.
107. This refusal to accord the prior zoning action a preference was particularly
appropriate in Palermo because the prior zoning classification was, for both landowners,
a change from the original zoning of the properties. See 561 So. 2d at 484-85.
108. See, e.g., Four States Realty Co. v. City of Baton Rouge, 309 So. 2d 659 (La.
1975); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. City of Alexandria, 155 So. 2d 776 (La. App. 3d Cir.),
writ denied, 245 La. '83, 157 So. 2d 230 (1963).
109. See Murchison, Local Government Law, Developments in the Law, 1980-1981,
42 La. L. Rev. 564, 582-83 (1982).
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On the facts before it, the supreme court's decision was unexcep-
tional. The plaintiffs produced expert testimony suggesting that the
property should continue to be zoned in a manner that would permit
its use as a landfill. To the contrary, the police jury's expert testified
that the rezoning was "consistent with good land use planning," and
that position was a reasonable one in view of the classification of
adjacent property. 10 In short, the evidence conflicted, and the matter
was therefore properly committed to the discretion of the police jury.
The supreme court was also correct in its summary rejection of two
of the procedural challenge's raised in Palermo. Unfortunately, the court
went farther than was necessary or prudent in rejecting a third procedural
claim.
The obvious purpose of the statutory notice requirements on which
the Palermo plaintiffs relied is to allow an opportunity for public input
before the planning commission forwards zoning recommendations to
the police jury. No similar need for public input arises when the com-
mission is merely directing its staff to prepare a background study that
the committee will use to prepare recommendations at a future meeting,",
and the supreme court commendably refrained from torturing the stat-
utory language to compel such a result.
The court's liberal construction of the requirement that a zoning
ordinance conform to a local government's comprehensive plan was also
praiseworthy. The reason for the requirement is to force local govern-
ments to follow accepted land use planning practices, not to create a
straitjacket that precludes reasonable changes. So long as the local
government's planning maps and zoning ordinances show a coherent
and consistent approach to land use planning, no good argument exists
for invalidating reasonable zoning decisions because the plan has not
been consolidated into a single document.
The court's treatment of the third procedural issue was less satis-
factory. Emphasizing the lack of an express statutory requirement for
personal notice in zoning matters, the court concluded that service by
publication is sufficient. In many zoning cases, service by publication
is appropriate because of the large number of property owners who will
be affected by the decision. In cases like Palermo, however, mailing
individual notices would have been neither expensive nor inconvenient
because only a small group of property owners were affected by the
zoning change.
The court should have construed the statute to incorporate a rea-
sonableness requirement with respect to notice. Such a requirement would
I0. 561 So. 2d at 495.
1l1. The planning commission did provide the statutory notices for the subsequent
meeting when it prepared its zoning recommendation. Id. at 496.
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mandate service by mail when the cost and inconvenience of that type
of notice is insubstantial, while reserving publication service for actions
that affect many landowners. The only possible objection to such a
reasonableness requirement is its imprecision. If further certainty is
desired, local governments could seek a statutory amendment that would
establish precisely when the number of property owners is large enough
to permit service by publication.
Obviously, the lack of personal notice should not be treated as a
jurisdictional element that automatically invalidates a zoning decision.
If the zoning authority made reasonable efforts to notify the affected
property owners orif the complaining property owner had actual knowl-
edge that the zoning action was being considered, constructive notice
by publication should suffice. Since the landfill owner and the adjacent
property owners were aggressively fighting the ordinance in Palermo, a
reasonableness requirement should not have changed the result in that
case. It might, however, provide a basis for preventing an injustice in
the future.
REMEDIES FOR UNSUCCESSFUL BIDDERS ON PUBLIC CONTRACTS
Louisiana law requires governmental bodies to award certain public
contracts to the lowest responsible bidder.112 Like most courts, the Louis-
iana Supreme Court has traditionally defined the purpose of these laws
in terms of preserving the public fisc rather than in terms of protecting
the interests of potential contractors." 3 Nonetheless, the court has long
permitted judicial review of contract award decisions and has allowed
an unsuccessful bidder to enjoin a contract award when the government
is acting in violation of a public bid law." 4
With its 1979 decision in Haughton Elevator Division v. State, '
the. Louisiana Supreme Court expanded the protections provided for
unsuccessful bidders. Justice Tate's opinion for the supreme court ma-
112. E.g., La. R.S. 38:2212 (1989); cf. La. R.S. 39:1594 (1989) (state procurement
code).
113. See, e.g., Smith v. Town.of Vinton, 216 La. 9, 19, 43 So. 2d 18, 21-22 (1949):
Boxwell v. Department of Highways, 203 La. 760, 770-71, 14 So. 2d 627, 631 (1943).
114. See, e.g., Sternberg v. Board of Comm'rs, 159 La. 360, 105 So. 372 (1925); St.
Landry Lumber Co. v. Mayor of Bunkie, 155 La. 892, 99 So. 687 (1924); State ex rel.
Bank of Franklinton v. La. State Bd. of Agric. & Immig., 122 La. 677, 48 So. 148
(1909); see also Housing Auth. of Opelousas v. Pittman Constr. Co., 264 F.2d 695 (5th
Cir. 1959).
115. 367 So. 2d 1161 (La. 1979); see Note, Shaping Specific Procedural Requirements
for Disqualification under Louisiana's Public Bid Law, 40 La. L. Rev. 871 (1980). Chief
Justice Summers dissented in Haughton, see 367 So. 2d at 1170, arguing that the state's
decision to disqualify Haughton reflected an appropriate exercise of its discretion under
the Public Works Law.
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jority repeated the traditional language regarding the purpose of public
bid laws, 16 but the actual holding mandated fairness for those who bid
on public contracts. The majority opinion characterized the lowest re-
sponsible bidder's power to enjoin, or to set aside, an unlawful contract
as a "right ... to receive the advertised contract, if any is let as a
consequence of the biddings" and concluded that this right required the
government to comply with the procedural protections of the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause before disqualifying a bidder as non-
responsible." 7 Specifically, the court ruled that a bidder was entitled to
written notice of the proposed disqualification, an informal hearing, a
written disqualification decision that listed the reasons for the disqual-
ification, and judicial review of the disqualification decision."'
Because the contract term had expired before the supreme court
rendered its decision in Haughton, the state argued that the case was
moot. Justice Tate rejected this argument and insisted that the dis-
qualified bidder was entitled to relief. In explaining why the case involved
a continuing controversy, he suggested that a bidder who was uncon-
stitutionally disqualified under a law requiring public bidding might have
a damages claim against the governmental body"9 and, perhaps, even
against the successful bidder.2 0
Shortly after the supreme court handed down the Haughton decision,
the Louisiana legislature amended the public bid law to incorporate the
procedures that the court had mandated.' The revised statute also
specifically authorized the district attorney, the attorney general, or any
interested party to bring suit when a contract was awarded in violation
of its provisions. In suits brought by the district attorney or the attorney
general, the amended statute provided for civil penalties against public
servants who authorized violations of the law, "' but it made no provision
for damage awards.
Not surprisingly, the Haughton dicta prompted new litigation con-
cerning the remedies available to unsuccessful bidders in contract disputes
116. 367 So. 2d at 1164.
117. Id. at 1165-66. Justice Tate did not discuss whether an unsuccessful bidder might
have a similar right under the due process clause of the state constitution. See La. Const.
art. 1, § 2.
118. 367 So. 2d at 1166.
119. Id. at 1169 n.8 ("At least arguably, the wrongful conduct of its employees makes
the state liable for damages .... .
120. Id. at 1169 n.9:
It appears doubtful to us that a higher bidder should be held liable for
damages, if the contract is improperly awarded to it by a governmental agency
(unless perhaps it participated in the commission of the wrongful act, La. Civ.
C. art. 2324). (emphasis added).
121. 1979 La. Acts, No. 795, § I (codified as La. R.S. 38:2212(J)).
122. Id. (codified as La. R.S. 38:2220).
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with public bodies. Some of the subsequent cases involved injunctive
relief. As in the past, courts of appeal occasionally mandated that the
contract be awarded to the lowest responsible bidder,' '3 but they more
commonly deferred to a decision to reject all bids and to readvertise
the contract. 24 In a 1987 decision, the Louisiana Supreme Court in
Bristol Steel & Iron Works, Inc. v. State emphasized the necessity of
a timely request for an injunction.' The court denied an injunction
where the successful bidder did not file its lawsuit until the challenged
contract had been substantially completed.
After Haughton, unsuccessful bidders requested damages as well as
injunctive relief. As early as 1982, the first circuit recognized a cause
of action for damages against the governmental body that awarded a
contract in violation of the public bid laws, 26 a position in which the
second and third circuits later concurred. 17 A 1986 decision of the
Louisiana Supreme Court cited the first circuit's opinion, '2  but the
court's actual holding narrowly defined the scope of an unsuccessful
bidder's right to claim damages from the person to whom a contract
had been improperly awarded. Following Justice Tate's dicta in Haugh-
ton, the supreme court in Alexander and Alexander, Inc. v. State con-
cluded that a successful bidder would be liable only when the bidder
was guilty of wrongful collusion with the governmental body that awarded
the contract. Specifically, Justice Calogaro's opinion for a unanimous
court ruled that an unsuccessful bidder is entitled to damages only "from
a higher bidder who was wrongfully awarded a contract after partici-
pating with a governmental agency in the commission of a wrongful
act." 2 9 Because the petition before the court contained no allegation of
wrongful conduct by the person to whom the contract had been awarded,
the supreme court held that the plaintiff had failed to state a cause of
action.
In the 1990-1991 term, the Louisiana Supreme Court addressed
another aspect of the remedy issue. Once again, the supreme court
narrowed the damage remedy available to an unsuccessful bidder. In
Airline Construction Co., Inc. v. Ascension Parish School Board,30 the
123. See, eg., Barber Bros. Contracting Co. v. Department of Transp. & Dev., 529
So. 2d 442 (La. App. 1st Cir.), rev'd, 533 So. 2d 1226 (1988).
124. See, e.g., Thigpen Constr. Co. v. Parish of Jefferson, 560 So. 2d 947 (La. App.
5th Cir. 1990).
125. 507 So. 2d 1233 (La. 1987).
126. Millette Enters., Inc. v. State, 417 So. 2d 6 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied,
417 So. 2d 363 (1982).
127. Davis v. Natchitoches Parish Sch. Bd., 525 So. 2d 624 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988);
North Cent. Utils., Inc. v. Walker Community Water Sys., Inc., 437 So. 2d 922 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1983), appeal after remand, 506 So. 2d 1325 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987).
128. Alexander and Alexander, Inc. v. State, 486 So. 2d 95, 98 (La. 1986).
129. Id. at 99.
130. 568 So. 2d 1029 (La. 1990).
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court refused to award damages where the plaintiff neglected to seek
an injunction forbidding the public body from awarding the contract
to the higher bidder and delayed filing the action for damages until the
completion date of the contract had passed.' 3'
In the Airline Construction opinion, Justice Lemmon offered three
arguments to support the refusal to permit a damage remedy. First, he
reemphasized that the purpose of the public bid law is to protect the
public rather than potential contractors.' Second, he noted that the
statute requiring the contract to be let by public bids made no express
provision for a damage remedy.'" Third, he appealed to authority in
the form of commentaries and cases from other jurisdictions. 3 '
The school board argued that an unsuccessful bidder on a public
contract does not have a cause of action against the public body for
damages "under any circumstances." Justice Lemmon, however, found
it unnecessary to reach that "broad issue." Instead, his Airline Con-
struction opinion confined itself to "the narrower holding that an un-
successful bidder on a public contract who fails to resort to the relief
granted by statute ... when the facts necessary for injunctive relief are
known or readily ascertainable by the bidder, is precluded from recov-
ering damages against the public body.'" Because the petition before
the court failed to allege that the plaintiff had filed a timely suit for
an injunction' 36 "or that circumstances exist[ed] which made the filing
131. The school board stated in a brief that the project had been substantially completed
before suit was filed, and all parties conceded that construction had been completed at
the time of the trial court's hearing on the defendant's exception of no cause of action.
Id. at 1031 nn.3 & 4.
132. Id. at 1032.
133. Id. at 1032-33.
134. Id. at 1033, citing Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 60 S. Ct. 869
(1940); Conduit & Foundation Corp. v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 485 N.E.2d 1005
(N.Y. 1985); Mottner v. Town of Mercer Island, 452 P.2d 750 (Wash. 1969); City of
Scottsdale v. Deem, 556 P.2d 328 (Ariz. 1976); R.S. Noonan, Inc. v. School Dist. of
York, 162 A.2d 623 (Pa. 1960); Tectonics, Inc. v. Castle Constr. Co., 496 So. 2d 704
(Ala. 1986); State Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Village of Pleasant Hill, 477 N.E.2d
509 (11. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 483 N.E.2d 887 (1985); Sutter Bros. Constr. Co. v.
City of Leavenworth, 708 P.2d 190 (Kan. 1985); 10 E. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal
Corporations § 29.86 (3d ed. 1990); Isham, Annotation, Public Contracts: Low Bidder's
Monetary Relief Against State Or Local Agency For Nonaward of Contract, 65 A.L.R.4th
93 (1988).
135. Airline Constr. Co. v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 568 So. 2d 1029, 1033 (La.
1990).
136. The court summarized the timeliness requirement as follows:
The timeliness of a suit for injunction depends on the facts and circumstances
of the particular case, including, among other things, the knowledge possessed
by the attacking bidder concerning the wrongful award of the contract, the
point in time the bidder acquired this knowledge, the point in time that the
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of a timely suit for an injunction impossible," it failed to state a cause
of action.' 37
Viewed in the context of earlier supreme court decisions, Airline
Construction represents a reasonable accommodation of the competing
interests involved in the public contract issue. Haughton established a
standard of procedural fairness for those who bid on public contracts,
while subsequent decisions recognized the importance of fairness for
successful bidders and reaffirmed the protection of the public fisc as
the underlying purpose of public bid laws. In Alexander, the court
refused to hold a successful bidder liable without proof of wrongful
collusion with the governmental body that made the contract award,
and in Bristol the court required a rejected bidder to act promptly to
preserve its right to injunctive relief against a governmental entity that
violated the public bid law. Airline Construction is fully consistent with
the theme of Bristol. To avoid an undue burden on the public treasury,
the court has now required an unsuccessful bidder to act promptly to
preserve its damage claim as well as its right to injunctive relief.
Airline Construction is unlikely to provide the final word on the
damage remedy issue. At least two questions will probably arise in future
litigation:
(1) Does an unsuccessful bidder who has filed a timely suit for
injunctive relief have a damage remedy?
(2) What is the appropriate measure of damages if the court
does allow the remedy?
In Airline Construction, the Louisiana Supreme Court declined to
decide whether an unsuccessful bidder could have a damage claim "under
any circumstances." Nonetheless, several related bits of evidence indicate
that the supreme court will recognize a damage remedy when the un-
successful bidder combines the damage claim with a timely request for
injunctive relief. 3 ' The court has held that the unsuccessful bidder has
a damage claim against a successful bidder who acts jointly with the
governmental body to violate the public bid law.1"9 In addition, the
court denied writs in a case in which the first circuit permitted damage
public body became indebted to the successful bidder, and the time period
between the awarding of the illegal contract and the completion of construction.
Id. at 1035.
137. Id. The court did grant the plaintiff an opportunity to amend the petition to
conform to the rule it established.
138. Accord, 368 So. 2d at 105 (concurring opinion of Justice Pro Tempore Shortess
arguing that "implicit in [the Airline Construction] decision is the notion that the un-
successful bidder who timely brings suit for an injunction has an action for damages").
139. Alexander and Alexander, Inc. v. State, 486 So. 2d 95, 99 (La. 1986).
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claims against the state. 4° Furthermore, the supreme court cited the first
circuit decision with apparent approval in its decision recognizing the
possibility of a claim against the successful bidder.' 4' Finally, allowing
a limited damage remedy is consistent with the supreme court's attempt
to ensure fairness to those who bid on public contracts so long as the
fairness mandate does not undermine the basic purpose of the public
bid laws.
The more difficult question concerns the appropriate measure of
damages. Fortunately, the issue should not arise frequently. Ordinarily,
an unsuccessful bidder who files a timely request for an injunction will
secure injunctive relief if the bidder is successful in challenging the
government's decision to award the contract to someone else. Only when
the government rejects all bids or the plaintiff prevails on the merits
after losing on a motion for preliminary injunction will the damage
issue arise.
Plaintiffs have generally argued that they should be allowed to
recover lost profits as well as their reliance damages. In collusion cases,
allowing lost profits is appropriate because profits can be awarded
without harm to the public fisc. The courts could fund the amount
awarded to the person whose bid was wrongfully rejected by reducing
the amount otherwise payable to the party to whom the contract was
awarded. However, that result seems unduly harsh to the successful
bidder who was not involved in .the illegal conduct, and awarding lost
profits without a corresponding decrease in the government's contractual
liability is inconsistent with the supreme court's repeated statement that
the puipose of public bid laws is to protect the taxpaying public.
Judge Shortess' brief concurring opinion in Airline Construction
suggests a better alternative for measuring damages in cases that do not
involve collusion between the governmental body and the person to
whom the contract was awarded. He would embrace a solution of the
Louisiana Procurement Code"' and grant the unsuccessful bidder a claim
for reasonable bid preparation costs but not for lost profits or other
exceptional damages. Not only is this approach consistent with recently
expressed legislative policy, it also represents a reasonable balance of
the competing interests in public contract cases. It protects the unsuc-
cessful bidder from direct financial loss in preparing a bid that is
wrongfully rejected by the public body without imposing a serious burden
140. Millette Enters., Inc. v. State, 417 So. 2d 6 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied,
417 So. 2d 363 (1982).
141. 486 So. 2d at 98.
142. La. R.S. 39:1678.1 (1989). That provision did not apply in Airline Construction
for two reasons: (1) it was not enacted until after the contract award was made, and (2)
the procurement code only applies to local governments that choose to abide by its
provisions. 'Id. at § 1554(E).
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on the public treasury. Although allowing recovery of bid preparation
costs would increase the cost of public contracts, the amount of the
damages is likely to be relatively modest, and governmental bodies will
have to pay them only when they abuse their considerable discretion
under public bid laws.
TORT IMMUNITY FOR LANDOWNERS
Louisiana has enacted two separate statutes which grant landowners
immunity from tort liability when they allow others to use their land
for noncommercial, recreational purposes. 43 Previous symposium articles
have traced the ambiguities in these statutes'" as well as the tension
between the supreme court's strict construction of the statutes and the
more generous construction in some decisions of the courts of appeal. 45
Recent supreme court decisions have consistently found the recre-
ational use immunity statutes inapplicable to specific factual situations
involving governmental defendants. 46 However, the court had never
directly faced the question of whether the immunity statutes could ever
apply to governmental defendants.'14 In Monteville v. Terrebonne Parish
Consolidated Government,141 the supreme court faced the issue. Speaking
for a bare majority that included one temporary member of the court,'4 9
Justice Dennis concluded that the immunity statutes "may not be applied
to immunize the state or its political subdivisions from tort liability."'5 0
A few months later, the court unanimously affirmed the Monteville
holding in Socorro v. City of New Orleans.1"'
143. La. R.S. 9:2791, 2795 (1991).
144. See Murchison, Local Government Law, 1985-1986, supra note 1, at 323-26.
145. See Murchison, Local Government Law, Developments in the Law, 1986-1987,
48 La. L. Rev. 303, 327-29 (1987); Murchison, Local Government Law, 1985-1986, supra
note I, at 326-27..
146. See, e.g., Ratcliff v. Town of Mandeville, 502 So. 2d 566 (La. 1987); Landry
v. Board of Levee Comm'rs, 477 So. 2d 672 (La. 1985); Keelen v. State, 463 So. 2d
1287 (La. 1985).
147. In a concurring opinion, Justice Dennis had declared his opinion that the statutory
immunity did not extend to governmental entities. See Keelen v. State, 482 So. 2d 618
(La. 1986) (Dennis, J., concurring).
148. 567 So. 2d 1097 (La. 1990).
149. Judge Melvin Shortess was sitting as justice pro tempore, in the position vacated
by the retirement of Chief Justice Dixon. Id. at 1097 n.*.
150. Id. at 1098. The court unanimously concluded that the premises on which the
plaintiff was injured did not qualify for immunity under the statutes. See id. at 1106
(concurring opinion of Justice Lemmon, and concurring opinion of Justice Marcus, in
which Justice Cole joined).
151. 579 So. 2d 931 (La. 1991).
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The linchpin for Justice Dennis' Monteville opinion was the principle
that the immunity statutes must be strictly construed.' Not content
merely to cite the court's own precedents accepting the principle,'" Justice
Dennis vigorously defended it with citations to decisions from other
jurisdictions. He argued that the recreational use immunity statutes
manifested two characteristics that made strict construction appropriate.
On the one hand, the statutes should "not be extended beyond their
obvious meaning" because they were statutes "in derogation of common
or natural right."'' 4 In addition, strict construction of the recreational
use immunity statutes was also appropriate because they provided "ad-
vantages to a special class of landowners against the general public."'"
Having established the general framework for analysis, Justice Dennis
turned to the specific issue of whether the statutory immunity extended
to governmental defendants. He began his analysis by noting that "[tihe
texts of the statutes are silent on the subjects of sovereign, state, or
governmental immunity." This silence was sufficient to create "at least
a reasonable doubt" as to whether the statutes protected governmental
landowners. Applying the principle of strict construction to resolve this
doubt, he concluded that the recreational use immunity statutes were
"a legislated inducement granted only to the owners of large acreages
of private land to open them to the public as outdoor recreation areas. ' ""
Drawing extensively on commentaries and cases from other juris-
dictions, Justice Dennis offered three basic arguments in support of the
holding that the statutes did not apply to governmental landowners.
First, he emphasized the origin of the legislative movement that produced
the statutes "as a response to the efforts of individual forest owners,
sportsmen and conservationists who wanted to make private lands more
available for recreational purposes.""' Second, he focused on the title
of the model act from which the second Louisiana statute was drawn
and on the commentary to the model act. Both the act and the com-
mentary contained references to the aim of the statute to make more
private lands available for outdoor recreational uses. Third, he noted
that, when the immunity statutes were initially proposed, sovereign im-
munity barred suits against governmental defendants. He viewed as
"improbable" the possibility "that the legislature intended to reinforce
that ancient and then firmly entrenched doctrine by means of a statute
152. Justice Dennis also repeated earlier dicta that the two statutes are to be interpreted
in pari materia, 567 So. 2d at 1100, citing Keelen v. State, 463 So. 2d 1287 (La. 1985),
but that principle of construction was not determinative for the result he reached.
153. See, e.g., Keelen v. State, 463 So. 2d 1287, 1289 (La. 1985).
154. 567 So. 2d at 1100.
155. Id. at 1101.
156. Id. at 1102.
157. Id.
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enacted to encourage landowners who might otherwise be fearful of
exposure to liability to open their lands to public recreational activi-
ties.' "'
Acknowledging that decisions from some other jurisdictions had
reached a contrary result, Justice Dennis distinguished those on the basis
of the way those states had abolished governmental immunity.
In those jurisdictions, the fundamental general rule is that the
sovereign or the state is immune from all tort liability. But this
immunity has been waived with certain exceptions or reserva-
tions. One of the reservations of immunity, usually contained
in a sovereign immunity statute or a torts claims act, in essence,
is that the state is to be held liable only in the same manner
and to the same extent as a private individual under like cir-
cumstances.5 9
By contrast, he asserted, the Louisiana Constitution simply abolishes
governmental immunity,'6 and the state lacks "any legislative provision
that equates governmental liability or immunity with that of a private
person."1ts
Justice Dennis' opinion will probably end the brief flurry of cases
in which governmental defendants have relied on the recreational use
immunity statutes. Although Justice Hall could conceivably have pro-
duced a different result when he joined the court, the new majority
would have had to overrule Monteville directly. The court having rejected
that alternative in Socorro, defendants-and lower courts-are likely to
focus their attention on other potential defenses.
As previous symposium articles have noted,'62 the recreational use
immunity statutes are a relatively minor factor in the potential tort
liability faced by local governments. The earlier limitation of their cov-
erage to the "true outdoors"' 3 made them largely unavailable to mu-
nicipalities, and even parishes could not rely on the statutes for developed
recreational areas that present the greatest risk of tort liability. None-
theless, recent reported decisions demonstrate that the number of cases
158. Id. at 1102-03. By the time Louisiana adopted its second statute in 1975, Louisiana
had abolished the immunity of the state and its political subdivisions. See La. Const..
art. Xi1, § 10. However, the model act that Louisiana embraced was framed long before
the abrogation of governmental immunity.
159. 567 So. 2d at 1103.
160. La. Const. art. XII, § 10.
161. 567 So. 2d at 1103-04.
162. Murchison, Local Government Law, supra note 145, 1986-87, at 329; Murchison,
Local Government Law, 1985-1986, supra note i, at 331-32.
163. Keelen v. State, 463 So. 2d 1287, 1290 (La. 1985).
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in which the defense might be asserted was far from insignificant,'"
and so some review of the wisdom of the supreme court's position is
warranted.
Even more so than is normally true, the problem for the court in
Monteville was formulating a sound construction of the statutes for a
problem that legislators failed to anticipate rather than interpreting the
statutes in light of an actual legislative intent for the particular issue.
Not only did the court face the usual lack of documentary evidence in
the form of committee reports, debates, or hearings, but at least two
additional factors suggest that the legislature gave little attention to the
details of how the recreational use immunity statutes would be applied.
For one thing, the legislature has enacted two separate statutes without
eliminating arguably inconsistent language in them. 16' For another, the
legislature enacted the 1975 statute without changing the common law
language defining ownership'6 or deleting irrelevant language covering
activities like snow mobiling.' 67
To support his interpretation of the statutes, Justice Dennis relied
primarily on the principle of strict construction. In addition, he bolstered
this principle by appealing to the historical context in which the statutes
were adopted, specifically mentioning the original aims of the legislative
movement that led to the statutes and the references to private lands
in the model act and its commentary. Finally, he distinguished contrary
decisions of other states because of the absolute character of Louisiana's
abrogation of the immunity of the state and its political subdivisions.
Ultimately, however, the Monteville rationale fails to justify the court's
decision for four reasons.
First, the principle of strict construction will not bear the weight
placed upon it. Judicial hostility to particular limits to general tort
principles and to special privileges for favored classes of defendants
supports narrow construction of the substance of immunity statutes.
164. E.g., Monteville v. Terrebonne Parish Consol. Gov't, 567 So. 2d 1097 (La. 990);
Ratcliff v. Town of Mandeville, 502 So. 2d 566 (La. 1987); Landry v. Board of Levee
Comm'rs, 477 So. 2d 672 (La. 1985); Keelen v. State, 463 So. 2d 1287 (La. 1985); Holder
v. Louisiana Parks Serv., 552 So. 2d 20 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989), writ denied, 556 So.
2d 59 (1990); Broussard v. Department of Transp. and Dev., 539 So. 2d 824 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1989); Sutter v. Audubon Park Comm'n, 533 So. 2d 1226 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1988). writ denied. 538 So. 2d 597 (1989); Adams v. State, 525 So. 2d 55 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1988); Stuart v. City of Morgan City, 504 So. 2d 934 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1987);
Herbert v. City of Kenner, 501 So. 2d 901 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1987); Cooper v. Brownlow,
491 So. 2d 693 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1986).
165. See Murchison, Local Government Law, 1985-1986, supra note I, at 325-26.
166. La. R.S. 9:2795(A)(2) (1991) ("'Owner' means the possessor of a fee interest, a
tenant, lessee, occupant or person in control of the premises.").
167. Id. at § 2795(A)(3) (1991) ("'Recreational purposes' includes ... ice skating,
sledding, snow mobiling, snow skiing .... ").
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However, those hostilities should be less important for deciding which
landowners benefit from the statutes. Creating a further exception to
the immunity statutes for governmental defendants increases the partic-
ularity of tort rules and accentuates the favoritism hccorded the protected
landowners.
Second, the historical arguments advanced by Justice Dennis are
unpersuasive. The original impetus for the legislative movement as well
as the model act and its commentary focus on private lands because
governmental immunity protected governmental bodies from liability when
the act was drafted. Thus, occasional references to the desire to open
private lands can hardly reflect a considered judgment about the much
different question of whether governmental landowners should be af-
forded the same immunity as private landowners once governmental
immunity has been abolished.
Third, the supreme court majority's approach to Louisiana's ab-
rogation of governmental immunity is inconsistent with the reasoning
of the court's own precedents. On at least two occasions, "the Louisiana
Supreme Court has indicated that [the constitutional abrogation of gov-
ernmental immunity] requires that governments be limited to the sub-
stantive defenses that would be available to private party defendants in
similar circumstances."' 16 If that approach is valid to deny defenses to
the government, it ought also to be valid to extend defenses to the
government.
Fourth, the result in Monteville creates an unnecessarily complex
integration of governmental bodies into general tort liability. The leg-
islature has fairly recently decided that governmental bodies should be
protected from liability in some cases where private parties are liable.' 69
In Monteville, the supreme court concluded that, a few years earlier,
the legislature provided that governmental bodies should be liable in
some cases in which private parties are protected from liability. The
rational principle that unites these discordant outcomes is difficult to
discern.
Ideally, the legislature should extend the protections of the recre-
ational use immunity statutes to governmental landowners so long as it
retains such statutes as part of Louisiana law. However, the 1991 leg-
islative session provided little indication that such a change will occur.
When the legislature failed to act, the supreme court should have re-
168. Murchison, Local Government Law, 1984-1985. supra note 1. at 519, citing Jones
v. City of Baton Rouge, 388 So. 2d 737 (La. 1980), and Segura v. Louisiana Architects
Selection Bd., 362 So. 2d 498 (La. 1978); accord, Robertson, Tort Liability of Govern-
mental Units in Louisiana, 64 Tul. L. Rev. 857, 862-64 (1990).
169. La. R.S. 9:2800 (1991). For an analysis suggesting that the statute might violate
the state constitution's abrogation of governmental immunity, see Murchison, Local Gov-
ernment Law, 1984-1985, supra note 1, at 530.
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considered the Monteville holding, but it refused to do so in Socorro.
Fortunately, the issue is a minor one for most local governments. Thus,
even though the denial of landowner immunity will probably be a
theoretical imperfection of Louisiana law, its actual financial impact on
local governments is likely to remain small.
